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ABSTRACT
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the
House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable
Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated. The Court has generally avoided the
contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions
because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases. In Raines v. Byrd, the Court
held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply
holding office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute. In a 2015 decision, Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court distinguished
Raines as a case involving individual legislators and relied on its 1939 decision in Coleman v.
Miller in holding that the Arizona Legislature had standing as an institution to challenge an
allegedly unconstitutional limitation on its legislative authority. In its Chadha and its Windsor
decisions, the Court suggested, but did not directly hold that Congress or a house of Congress has
standing in some circumstances to defend its institutional constitutional authority. The Arizona,
Chadha and Windsor decisions implicitly support congressional standing in Burwell. The Article
argues in favor of institutional congressional standing by Congress, a house of Congress or a duly
authorized committee to defend core constitutional authority possessed by Congress, but against
legislative suits merely challenging how the executive branch implements a particular federal
statute
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INTRODUCTION
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, U.S. District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2015 held that the U.S. House of Representatives has Article III
standing to challenge certain provisions of the Patient Protection and
1
Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act” or “ACA”) as violations
1

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (explaining that the
ACA seeks “to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and de-
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2

of the U.S. Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme
Court’s and lower federal courts’ jurisprudence on legislative stand3
ing is complicated. In its 1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that twenty Kansas state senators, who constituted
exactly half of the Kansas State Senate, could file a mandamus action
against the Secretary of the Senate of the State of Kansas to contest
whether the State Senate had in fact ratified the Child Labor
4
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. By contrast, in its 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of
Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding
office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute even if Congress has enacted a statute purporting to grant standing to any legislators to challenge that statute, unless the legislator can prove she suffered a personal concrete injury from its passage similar to any
5
ordinary litigant. The broad approach to legislative standing in
Coleman and the narrower approach in Raines are in some tension,
although it is possible to distinguish these two cases because they in6
volve very different facts. In a 2015 decision, Arizona State Legislature
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court distinguished
Raines as a case involving individual legislators and relied on Coleman
in holding that the Arizona Legislature had standing to challenge
Proposition 106, a statewide citizen’s initiative that delegated redis7
tricting authority to an independent commission. The Arizona State
Legislature Court explicitly avoided the contentious question of

2

3

4
5
6

7

crease the cost of health care”); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015)
(“The [ACA] adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the
individual health insurance market.”).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 70–76 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that “the constitutional trespass alleged in this case would inflict a concrete, particular
harm upon the House for which it has standing to seek redress”). The Appropriations
Clause states in part: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
Bradford C. Mank, Does United States v. Windsor (the DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U PITT. L. REV. 1, 22–30 (2014) (discussing legislative standing
cases and acknowledging the difficulty of analogizing these cases to situations involving
Congesss); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 339, 358–63 (2015) (noting that lower courts have “greatly struggled with” congressional standing issues); see infra Part II.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–46 (1939) (involving the vote in the Kansas Legislature); see infra Part II.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–30 (1997) (holding that state legislators do not suffer
injury to themselves which would give them Article III standing).
Mank, supra note 3, at 25–26 (discussing how Raines distinguished Coleman on the basis
that the latter decision concerned “the fundamental issue of whether a purported legislative action established a valid law or not”); see infra Part II.
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redisricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015).
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whether the U.S. Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential or executive actions because of the difficult separation-of8
powers concerns in such cases.
The U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell suit may finally force the
Supreme Court to address whether Congress has standing to bring a
suit against the President. There is a stronger argument for granting
legislative standing in this case because the appropriations power is a
core constitutional power given to the House and an entire house of
9
Congress filed suit rather than just individual legislators. A more difficult question is whether Congress may challenge any alleged legal
10
breach by the executive branch.
Part I will discuss the basics of Article III standing and the separation-of-powers concerns raised by congressional suits against the Pres11
ident.
Part II examines the complex issues involving legislative
12
standing. Part III explores the reasoning in U.S. House of Representa13
tives v. Burwell. Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s decision in
14
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha. Part V discusses the
majority opinion and two dissenting opinions in United States v. Wind15
sor. The Conclusion argues in favor of institutional congressional
standing by Congress, a house of Congress, or a duly authorized
committee to defend core constitutional authority possessed by Congress, but against legislative suits merely challenging how the execu16
tive branch implements a particular federal statute.
17

I. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE III STANDING

The Constitution does not expressly require that each plaintiff suing in a federal court prove standing; nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has interpreted Article III’s limitation of judicial authority to
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 2665 n.12 (“The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether
Congress has standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal analogue
to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would raise
separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”).
See infra Part II.
See infra Parts I, IV, and Conclusion; see also Mank, supra note 3, at 22–30, 40–62 (discussing competing arguments for and against finding congressional standing).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
462 U.S. 919, 919–59 (1983) (holding that Congress may not create a power for itself to
to have a legislative veto over executive actions); infra Part IV.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); infra Part V.C–E.
See infra Conclusion.
The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing article cited in footnote 3.
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actual “Cases” and “Controversies” as imposing constitutional stand18
ing requirements. The Supreme Court has formulated a three-part
test for constitutional Article III standing that requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that: (1) he has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” which is (a)
“concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there [is] a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court”; and (3) “it [is] likely, as opposed to merely
19
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
A plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all three standing re20
quirements. Thus, for an Article III court to have jurisdiction over a
suit, at least one plaintiff must prove he has standing for each form of
21
relief sought. Federal courts must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction if no plaintiff demonstrates the three Article III standing re22
quirements.

18

19

20

21

22

The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section 2, which
provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41
(2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that “[i]f a dispute is not a
proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it”). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE WES. RES. L. REV.
1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended
the Constitution to require standing to sue).
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Nash, supra
note 3, at 347 (quoting the same).
See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must
“carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
(same).
See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)) (confirming that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”).
See id. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case-or-controversy requirement);
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the outset of the
litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements).
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As discussed above, standing requirements are grounded in fundamental constitutional principles inferred from Article III’s explication of the judicial authority of federal courts. For example, Article
III standing principles prohibit advisory opinions as unconstitutional
because such opinions are not based on an actual “case” or “contro23
versy.” Moreover, Article III standing requirements are based on
fundamental separation-of-powers principles inferred from the Constitution’s three-branch form of government, which includes the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of government so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and
24
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”
Congress may not authorize suits that violate fundamental stand25
ing principles. However, different members of the Supreme Court
have disagreed concerning the degree to which separation-of-powers
principles restrict Congress’s authority to authorize standing to sue in
federal courts for private citizen suits challenging executive branch
26
decisions.
Furthermore, there are also significant separation-ofpowers concerns when Congress or a house of Congress seeks stand27
ing to sue the President. Article II of the Constitution requires that
28
the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” As
will be discussed in Part IV, Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Windsor, argued that the executive branch
has the exclusive authority in most circumstances under Article II’s
23

24

25

26

27
28

See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts
the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ . . . Federal courts may not ‘decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them’ or give
‘opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”) (citations
omitted).
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), partially abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)).
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Nat Stern,
The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (emphasizing
the fundamental principle of the judiciary’s “scrupulous adherence to standing requirements”).
Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–78 (concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution
limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for support), with id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . .”), and
id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of the majority’s
approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates”).
See infra Parts II–IV.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Take Care Clause to defend, or not to defend, federal statutes.
However, he acknowledged that there may be an exception for legis30
lative standing when Congress defends a core institutional power.
Some academics go further than Justice Scalia by arguing that executive authority under Article II’s Take Care Clause is absolutely exclusive and would bar any suits by Congress challenging the enforce31
ment or non-enforcement of a federal statute.
Because of
separation-of-powers issues raised by Article II’s Take Care Clause,
the question of legislative standing is controversial, as Part II will
32
show.
II. LEGISLATIVE STANDING
Whether Congress has Article III standing to challenge a presi33
For indential action or inaction raises complicated questions.
stance, Congress or a house of Congress has stronger grounds for

29

30

31

32
33

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the executive in most circumstances has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes
under Article II, thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a law); see infra Part IV.D.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, at 2700; see also Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1548–49 (2012) (“Chadha, in
short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional stake to support a case or controversy where it seeks to defend a power granted to it by a statute. Chadha does not hold
that Congress may intervene to defend any challenged federal statute . . . .”).
Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 571, 572–76, 625–30 (2014) (arguing that Article II’s Take Care Clause
gives the executive branch the exclusive authority to defend federal laws thus precluding
congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce law). But
see Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principle-Agent Problem, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 1201, 1219–20 (2012) (“Defending [a] law . . . does not focus on the operation
of the law and generally will not affect its operation at all. . . . [T]he Executive simply
provides the court with its understanding of what the Constitution requires . . . .”); Bethany R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439 (2016) (arguing that Congress
should have institutional standing when a President refuses to enforce a federal statute).
See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 11–16 (discussing competing scholarly views on the issue of congressional standing).
See infra Part II.
See Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582–98 (2012) (arguing that Congress as an institution, or either house, has standing to defend a statute that the President
refuses to defend, but acknowledging counter-arguments); Mank, supra note 3, at 23;
Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1209–13 (2012)
(“[I]t is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may intervene as a party or
simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights
of a party at the district court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce documents, and the like.”); id. at 1210 n.133 (discussing cases).
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standing than individual members when it is suing to defend a legis34
lature’s institutional powers. Furthermore, some important legislative standing cases have involved state or territorial legislators that do
not raise the same type of separation-of-powers concerns that arise
35
when Congress sues the President.
A. Legislative Standing Cases, 1939–2014: Coleman and Raines Define
the Line for Legislative Standing
1. Coleman v. Miller
In Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that twenty Kansas
state senators could seek a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of
the Senate of the State of Kansas to contest whether the Kansas State
Senate actually ratified the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S. Con36
stitution. There had been a tie vote of twenty to twenty in the Kansas Senate for the proposed Amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, had broken the tie by
37
voting in favor of the Amendment. The twenty state senators who
voted against the Amendment argued that amendments to the U.S.
Constitution must be enacted by state legislators only and that state
38
executive officials should not vote on proposed amendments. The
Supreme Court of Kansas denied the writ because it concluded on
the merits that the Amendment was validly enacted because the Lieu-

34

35

36

37
38

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (“We attach some importance to the fact that
appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in
this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit. . . . We therefore hold that
these individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this
dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III
standing.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 23; see infra Parts II–IV.
See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redisricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665
n.12 (2015) (explaining that its decision only addressed legislative standing for state legislatures and not standing when Congress sues the President, which raises separation-ofpowers concerns absent in the former type of case); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–
46 (1939) (involving a vote in the Kansas Legislature); Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d
539, 542–47 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving bill passed by Guam territorial legislature); Mank,
supra note 3, at 23–24, 27; see infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438–46 (holding that the twenty state senators had a Fifth Amendment right to have their vote given effect and that the state court abdridged that right);
Mank, supra note 3, at 23–24.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–38 (holding that the court has jurisdiction since twenty state
senators had a Fifth Amendment right to have their votes given effect).
Id. at 436. The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently voted to ratify the
Amendment. Id.
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tenant Governor may cast the deciding vote on proposed amend39
ments.
After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, determined that the twenty
Kansas state senators had standing to sue because they had an interest in the “effectiveness of their votes” and whether their votes were
40
“given effect.” He explained,
We find no departure from principle in recognizing in the instant case
that at least the twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the
proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy
which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding
the federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review
41
that decision.

Crucially, the Kansas senator-plaintiffs were not complaining about
the state executive’s implementation or interpretation of a law, but
instead whether the Lieutenant Governor had interfered with the leg42
islative process to nullify their votes as a legislative body.
2. Raines v. Byrd
In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that individual members of Congress normally do not have Article III standing by merely
holding office to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional statute, despite Congress’s enactment of a statute purporting to grant standing
43
to legislators to challenge that statute, unless the legislator can
demonstrate he has suffered a personal concrete injury from its pas44
sage like any plaintiff. Senator Robert Byrd and several other mem45
bers of Congress in Raines alleged that the Line Item Veto Act damaged the institution of Congress by unconstitutionally expanding the
president’s veto authority, but the Court determined that individual
members of Congress could not sue based on possible generalized
harm to the legislature when they failed to demonstrate that “their
39
40
41
42
43

44
45

Id. at 437.
Id. at 438 (holding that the twenty state senators had a right under the Constitution that
was denied in this instance); Mank, supra note 3, at 24.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446.
See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2015)
(interpreting the Coleman decision).
The statute provided that any member of Congress could assert a constitutional violation
and sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the Line Item Veto Act. Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1997).
Id. at 821–30 (differentiating between the injury suffered to a legislator as a political power and as a private injury); Mank, supra note 3, at 24–26.
See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. 104–130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
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claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise ju46
dicially cognizable.” Also, the Court noted that “[w]e attach some
importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and in47
deed both Houses actively oppose their suit.” Thus, the Raines decision did not address whether Congress or a house of Congress has
48
standing as an institution to challenge executive actions.
The Court in Raines distinguished its decision in Coleman and
49
strongly implied that case was still good law. After reviewing the issues and decision in Coleman, the Raines decision commented:
It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands . . . for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or
enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that
50
their votes have been completely nullified.

The Raines decision distinguished Coleman from the facts in its case by
explaining that only Coleman involved the fundamental issue of
whether a purported legislative action established a valid law or not:
“There is a vast difference between the level of vote nullification at
issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative
power that is alleged here. To uphold standing here would require a
51
drastic extension of Coleman. We are unwilling to take that step.”
Additionally, the Raines decision distinguished the facts in its case
from those in Coleman by observing that “the institutional injury they

46

47
48

49

50

51

Raines, 521 U.S. at 820; see also id. at 821, 830 (recognizing that the claim was not for a
private personal injury). By contrast, a member of Congress might be able to sue to defend his personal interest in holding his seat in Congress. Id. at 820–21 (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512–14 (1969) (holding that a member of Congress
could sue to challenge his exclusion from the House of Representatives and his loss of his
salary)).
Id. at 829 (stating that the appellees have not alleged any injury to themselves).
See id. at 829–30 (rejecting standing for individual members of Congress, but observing
that both houses opposed their suit against the Line Item Veto Act); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–69, 71–72 (D.D.C. 2015) (interpreting the
Raines decision); Mank, supra note 3, at 25.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821–29; Mank, supra note 3, at 25. But cf. Nash, supra note 3, at 351–53
(arguing that Raines read Coleman narrowly, and that Raines even suggested that Coleman
might not apply to standing for congressional suits, but also suggested that congressional
institutional standing might be valid).
Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (footnote omitted). In footnote eight of the Raines decision, the
Court explained that it was not deciding whether Coleman could be distinguished neither
on the grounds that the Court in Coleman viewed what it concluded to be the senators’ interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes as a basis for invoking federal interest, nor on the grounds that Coleman did not involve the separation-of-powers issues involved in congressional suits. Id. at 824–25 n.8.
Id. at 826; Mank, supra note 3, at 25–26.
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52

allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed (contra, Coleman)”.
Moreover, the Raines decision justified the denial of standing for
members of Congress on the grounds that Congress could simply repeal the disputed statute or exempt appropriations bills from its application; the Court emphasized that its decision does not address the
question of whether Congress or a member of Congress has standing
53
when it cannot repeal the disputed statute. Accordingly, the Raines
decision usually prevents suits by individual members of Congress
who allege that a statute has diminished the institutional authority of
the legislative branch, especially where Congress may simply repeal a
54
disputed statute.
Raines, nevertheless, potentially allows the possibility of a suit challenging whether a federal statute is an effective law or not, similar to
the Coleman decision. However, the Raines decision explicitly declined to address whether a suit comparable to Coleman can be filed
by members of or a house of Congress. It also declined to explicitly
address whether such a suit would be barred by separation-of-powers
concerns or other factors not applicable to Coleman, which involved
55
state legislators. The Raines decision did not consider suits where
Congress or a house of Congress argues that executive action has arguably diminished Congress’s institutional authority, which is dis56
cussed in Parts IV and V. The Raines decision also failed to consider
cases where a plurality of Congress might have grounds to challenge
an action that requires a two-thirds supermajority of Congress or a
57
house of Congress, such as approval of a treaty by the U.S. Senate.
After the Raines decision, lower courts have rejected suits by individual legislators that allege that an executive official has improperly
implemented a law, but individual legislators still may be able to sue if
they allege, as in Coleman, that an executive officer has interfered with
the legislative process so as to raise questions whether a law was valid58
ly enacted. For instance, in Russell v. DeJongh, a senator in the Virgin
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
Id. at 829–30; Mank, supra note 3, at 26.
Mank, supra note 3, at 26.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8 (declining to decide whether a suit by federal legislators similar to Coleman would be appropriate); Mank, supra note 3, at 26.
See Nash, supra note 3, at 376–78 (criticizing Raines for failing to consider congressional
challenges involving issues other than vote nullification); infra Parts IV and V.
See Nash, supra note 3, at 376–77 (noting that Raines does not account for likely scenarios
in which Congress should have standing but are obstructed under the holding).
See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying Raines’s approach
of denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging the
President violated the War Powers Act because members have a legislative remedy and
therefore do not need to sue in federal court); Mank, supra note 3, at 26; see also Cheno-
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Islands territorial legislature sued to void certain judicial commissions
because the Governor had allegedly failed to follow proper appoint59
Dismissing the case for lack of standing, the
ment procedures.
Third Circuit explained the difference between cases like Raines that
deny legislative standing and Coleman’s recognition of standing:
The courts have drawn a distinction . . . between a public official’s mere
disobedience of a law for which a legislator voted—which is not an injury
in fact—and an official’s “distortion of the process by which a bill becomes law” by nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a legislator of an
60
opportunity to vote—which is an injury in fact.

Furthermore, the Third Circuit interpreted the Coleman exception for
legislative standing as applying to only cases where legislators had no
effective political remedy, such as a President’s decision to terminate
a treaty, or at least where a supermajority was needed to overturn an
61
executive decision. On the other hand, similar to Raines, the Virgin
Islands’ “Legislature was free to confirm, reject, or defer voting on
the Governor’s nominees,” and, accordingly, there was no compelling
reason to allow a legislative member to sue in court when the political
62
process could provide an effective remedy.
3. Pocket Veto Cases
63

In pocket veto cases addressing whether a President’s or territorial governor’s inaction causes a bill to become a law or not to become a law, lower courts have followed Coleman’s approach to find
legislative standing, although the Supreme Court has never resolved
64
the issue. In Kennedy v. Sampson, a pre-Raines decision, Congress
weth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying Raines’s approach of
denying legislative standing for individual members of Congress in a case alleging the
President’s executive order for the protection of rivers exceeded his authority and diminished congressional authority); see also Greene, supra note 33, at 584–85 (discussing the
reasoning behind Raines and Chenoweth in light of the Coleman holding).
59
491 F.3d 130, 131–33 (3d Cir. 2007); Mank, supra note 3, at 26–27.
60
Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d, 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007).
61
Id. at 135–36 (explaining that a key feature of Coleman and several lower-court cases was
that “the challenged actions in those cases left the plaintiffs with no effective remedies in
the political process”); Mank, supra note 3, at 27.
62
Russell, 491 F.3d at 136; Mank, supra note 3, at 27.
63
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 implicitly gives the President the authority to pocket veto legislation in certain circumstances where Congress is adjourned:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
Law.
64
See Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 542–47 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Coleman
decision to hold that the Governor of Guam had standing to challenge the Guam Su-

Oct. 2016]

DOES A HOUSE OF CONGRESS HAVE STANDING?

153

passed a bill that President Richard Nixon neither signed nor formally vetoed, but he had issued a memorandum of disapproval that stated his decision not to sign the bill in an implied effort to pocket veto
65
the bill under Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Citing
Coleman, the D.C. Circuit held that Senator Edward Kennedy had
standing to determine whether the bill had become law:
In the present case, appellee has alleged that conduct by officials of the
Executive branch amounted to an illegal nullification not only of Congress’ exercise of its power, but also of appellee’s exercise of his power.
In the language of the Coleman opinion, appellee’s object in this lawsuit is
to vindicate the effectiveness of his vote. No more essential interest
could be asserted by a legislator. We are satisfied, therefore, that the
66
purposes of the standing doctrine are fully served in this litigation.

In 1999, the D.C. Circuit in Chenoweth v. Clinton addressed whether the Kennedy decision was still good law in light of the Raines deci67
sion and other decisions restricting the scope of Article III standing.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Kennedy “may survive as a peculiar
68
application of the narrow rule announced in Coleman.” The Chenoweth decision explained:
Although Coleman could be interpreted more broadly, the Raines
Court read the case to stand only for the proposition that “legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect
(or does not go into effect) on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified.” . . . Even under this narrow interpretation, one
could argue that the plaintiff in Kennedy had standing. The pocket veto
challenged in that case had made ineffective a bill that both houses of
the Congress had approved. Because it was the President’s veto—not a
lack of legislative support—that prevented the bill from becoming law
(either directly or by the Congress voting to override the President’s ve-

65

66
67
68

preme Court decision that his failure to sign a bill resulted in a pocket veto preventing
the bill from becoming law); see also Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116–17 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (concluding that prior D.C. Circuit cases finding legislative standing in pocket
veto cases are probably still good law because they are controlled by Coleman decision); see
also Greene, supra note 33, at 586–88 (arguing that pocket veto cases fall within Coleman’s
legislative standing rule); Mank, supra note 3, at 27–29.
511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that individual members of Congress and congressional leaders had
standing in a pocket veto case). Congress had adjourned within eight days of the bill’s
passage, but the Senate appointed an agent to take messages from the president to avoid
a pocket veto. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436.
181 F.3d at 114–17; Mank, supra note 3, at 28–29.
Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 116.
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to), those in the majority could plausibly describe the President’s action
69
as a complete nullification of their votes.

In pocket veto cases, individual legislators may be able to sue to determine, as in Coleman, whether a law was effectively ratified by the
70
legislator or nullified by the President or governor.
4. Institutional Authority Cases, Especially Congressional Subpoenas
Several decisions in the D.C. Circuit have concluded or suggested
that a house of Congress or its committees has standing to sue to protect the institutional authority of Congress or that house, especially in
71
cases involving congressional subpoenas. Professor Jonathan Remy
Nash agrees that Congress generally has standing to seek information
because obtaining such information is central to its legislative over72
sight, voting, and drafting functions. He explains that a functionalist approach to standing, including the need of Congress to gather
information, is more likely to support congressional standing than a
formalist approach to standing that favors traditional common law
adjudication and avoids having courts resolve intra-branch disputes
73
between Congress and the President. Addressing the more difficult
question of congressional suits challenging the executive’s nondefense or nonenforcement of laws, however, Professor Stern argues
that “the scholarly debate over congressional standing to enforce or

69

70
71

72

73

Id. at 116–17; see also Nash, supra note 3, at 360–61 (arguing that even if Kennedy and
Coleman survive according to the Chenoweth decision, that decision took a narrow view of
when Congress has standing to challenge executive branch actions).
Mank, supra note 3, at 27–29 (discussing the foundation set by Coleman for courts to analyze legislative standing in pocket veto cases).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–68, 78 (D.D.C. 2015)
(outlining recent District of Columbia cases, many of which held in favor of legislative
standing).
Nash, supra note 3, at 343, 358, 363–67, 373–75, 388 (“Beyond the Court’s narrow construction of congressional function in Raines, Congress gathers information, and therefore should have standing to vindicate that information-gathering function.”). While the
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly authorize Congress’s authority to hold hearings and
gather information, the Supreme Court has recognized the power of Congress to conduct
investigations based upon practices dating to the early days of the Republic, as well as in
colonial legislatures and the British Parliament. Id. at 363–65; see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1927) (recognizing the authority of Congress to hold
hearings and take testimony based on historical record and functional reasons rather
than on set provisions).
Nash, supra note 3, at 363–75. Professor Nash acknowledges that the Raines decision was
“unnecessarily stingy in its understanding of congressional function,” but argues that the
view that the Raines decision calls “into question constitutional standing when a congressional committee enforces a subpoena against an executive branch actor, but not otherwise, is implausible.” Id. at 369–75.
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defend federal statutes has pitted formalists categorically opposing
such standing against functionalists who view Congress’s ability to
bring suit in certain circumstances as a necessary mechanism to prevent executive arrogation of power,” that the Supreme Court has taken a “hybrid” or inconsistent approach combining elements of formalism and functionalism in its separation-of-powers decisions, that
the Court has avoided firmly deciding congressional standing issues
because of the tension between its formalist and functionalist decisions, but that the Court is unlikely to recognize legislative challenges
74
to a President’s failure to defend or enforce a federal statute.
In United States v. AT&T, the D.C. Circuit held that the House of
Representatives had standing to sue in an official capacity to demand
information from the executive branch pursuant to Congress’s inves75
tigatory powers, although the court remanded the case back to the
district court and urged the executive and legislative branches to set76
tle a difficult case.
The functionalist approach to congressional
standing underlies the AT&T decision, which involved a dispute over
congressional subpoenas that sought to compel information from
AT&T related to warrantless wiretaps that the executive branch re77
fused to release for national security reasons. The D.C. Circuit con78
cluded it had federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and
also held that it was “clear that the House as a whole has standing to
assert its investigatory power, and can designate a member to act on
79
its behalf.”
The AT&T decision determined that the Supreme
80
Court’s decision in U.S. v. Nixon, which had involved an “analogous
conflict between the executive and judicial branches and stands for
the justiciability of such a case,” had “establish[ed], at a minimum,
that the mere fact that there is a conflict between the legislative and
executive branches . . . does not preclude judicial resolution of the
81
conflict.” However, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case because it
determined that the complicated national security questions involved

74
75

76
77
78
79
80
81

Stern, supra note 25, at 51–58.
551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Although formally designated as a lawsuit between
the United States and AT&T, the latter’s only interest was “to determine its legal duty”
under a congressional subpoena that the executive had advised it to ignore. Id. at 385,
388–89.
Id. at 385, 391–95.
Id. at 385–88.
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 391.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
AT&T, 551 F.2d at 390 (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
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required more fact finding by the district court before courts could
resolve the political question justiciability issues raised, and it urged
the executive and legislative branches to settle the difficult questions
82
in the case.
Several more recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia have followed the AT&T decision’s approach in
finding that a house or a congressional committee has standing or jurisdiction to sue the executive branch to seek information from the
executive branch pursuant to its investigatory powers. In Committee on
Oversight & Government Reform v. Holder, the district court found that
“neither the Constitution nor prudential considerations require
judges to stand on the sidelines. There is federal subject matter jurisdiction over this complaint, and it alleges a cause of action that
83
plaintiff has standing to bring.” The court cited the AT&T decision,
the Nixon decision, and a district court decision in Committee on the Ju84
diciary v. Miers, which is discussed below, for the proposition that
federal courts may resolve disputes between the political branches
85
over congressional requests for information. The Committee on Oversight & Government Reform decision distinguished the Raines decision
as involving only individual members of Congress and not the institu86
tional interests of a duly authorized committee of Congress. Furthermore, while it raised concerns about the potential “problems that
could arise if individual executive officials or Members of Congress
were to challenge the merits of decisions committed to the other
branch of government in a lawsuit,” the district court in Committee on
Oversight & Goverment Reform concluded that the Raines decision had
not decided whether Congress may sue to protect its institutional in87
terests.
In Committee on the Judiciary, the district court held that the House
Committee on the Judiciary, which was acting on behalf of the entire
House of Representatives, had standing to bring a civil action to en88
force congressional subpoenas issued to senior presidential aides.
The court relied upon the AT&T decision and concluded that case
89
“survive[d]” the Raines decision. The district court distinguished its
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

AT&T, 551 F.2d at 390–95.
979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013).
558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 4, 9–12, 16 (citing AT&T, Nixon,
and Committee on the Judiciary).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. (discussing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828–30 (1997)).
558 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56, 67–71.
Id. at 67–71.
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facts involving an institutional injury from the suits filed by individual
90
members of Congress in Raines: “But the Court has never held that
an institution, such as the House of Representatives, cannot file suit
to address an institutional harm. Because the issues presented by
Raines and [AT&T] were not the same, one cannot conclude that
91
Raines overruled or undermined [AT&T].” Furthermore, the Committee on the Judiciary decision reasoned that both its case and the
AT&T decision involved concrete issues involving the enforcement of
congressional subpoenas, whereas “the purported injury [in Raines]
92
was wholly hypothetical.” Accordingly, the district court in Committee
on the Judiciary held that a House committee had standing to sue to
93
enforce congressional subpoenas issued to senior presidential aides.
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Department of Commerce, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded “that [the
House of Representatives] has properly alleged a judicially cognizable
injury through its right to receive information by statute and through
the institutional interest in its lawful composition” when it sued to obtain census information guaranteed to it by a statute and “necessary
to perform a constitutionally mandated function” in apportioning the
94
number of members to each state. The court held that the House of
Representatives suffered a concrete and particularized informational
injury when the President and the Census Bureau failed to provide
information about statistical sampling techniques used by the Bureau
in the 2000 Census that a statute required the executive branch to
95
provide to Congress. The court distinguished the Raines decision as
involving a suit by individual legislators and not involving the institutional interest of the House in how the Census is counted for purpos96
es of apportioning seats in that body. The court explained: “And,
the institutional interest is not widely dispersed [as it was in Raines]; it
is particularized to the House of Representatives because the House’s
composition will be affected by the manner in which the Bureau
97
conducts the Census.” Thus, in the D.C. Circuit, both the AT&T
decision and at least three district court decisions support the institutional authority of Congress, a house of Congress, or a duly authorized committee to receive information pursuant to valid subpoenas or
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 67–71.
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85–87 (D.D.C. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 89.
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98

other appropriate statutory rights. Furthermore, four district decisions, including Judge Collyer’s recent decision regarding the Affordable Care Act, agreed that the D.C. Circuit’s AT&T decision
99
“survives Raines.”
B. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission
The most recent Supreme Court decision on legislative standing is
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commis100
sion. The Arizona state legislature filed suit challenging Proposition
106, a statewide citizen’s initiative that assigned congressional redistricting authority to an independent commission instead of the legis101
lature. The Arizona legislature contended that Proposition 106 vio102
lated the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, which gives state
legislatures “primary responsibility” over congressional redistricting
103
decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that the Arizona legislature had standing to sue because Proposition 106 “strip[ped] the legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting,” and, therefore, that the legislature had alleged a sufficient injury in fact for
104
Article III standing.
The Arizona State Legislature decision distinguished the Raines case
by emphasizing its narrow holding “that six individual Members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act” and
that “[t]he ‘institutional injury’ at issue, we reasoned, scarcely zeroed
105
in on any individual Member.” The Arizona State Legislature opinion
98

99

100
101
102

103

104

105

See id. at 86 (discussing cases recognizing the authority of a house of Congress or congressional committee to issue valid subpoenas or obtain information in support of its institutional investigatory powers); supra Part II.A.4.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 68 (citing Department of
Commerce, Commission on Oversight & Government Reform, and Committee on the Judiciary); supra Part II.A.4.
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
Id. at 2658–59, 2661.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof
. . . .”).
Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 51–3, Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015) (No. 131314)).
Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663. On the merits, a divided Court determined
that Proposition 106’s creation of a state redistricting commission did not violate the
Constitution’s Elections Clause. Id. at 2671–77.
Id. at 2664 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997)); accord Nash, supra note 3,
at 353 (arguing that the Arizona State Legislature decision distinguished Raines); see also
Raines, 521 U.S. at 813–14, 821, 830); id. at 2664..
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emphasized that there was “some importance to the fact that [the
Raines plaintiffs had] not been authorized to represent their respec106
By contrast, the Arizona legislature was
tive Houses of Congress.”
107
“an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury.”
The Arizona State Legislature decision reasoned that the Coleman
decision, which had recognized legislative standing, was “[c]loser to
108
the mark” of the facts in its case.
The Raines decision had explained the Coleman decision as standing “‘for the proposition that
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact)
a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their
109
votes have been completely nullified.’” The Arizona State Legislature
decision concluded that the Arizona legislature had Article III standing because “Proposition 106, together with the Arizona Constitution’s ban on efforts to undermine the purposes of an initiative . . . would ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by the legislature, now
or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan,” and,
therefore, made the case similar to Coleman as the case was interpret110
ed in Raines. The Arizona State Legislature opinion explicitly avoided
the issue of whether Congress, a house of Congress, or a congressional committee has standing to sue the President: “The case before us
does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal analogue to Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and
the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns absent
111
here.”
III. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES V. BURWELL
In her 2015 opinion in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
Judge Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the House of Representatives had Article III standing to
challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations
of the U.S. Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, which requires that
all federal government spending occur only if Congress appropriates
106
107
108
109
110
111

Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829) (alteration in
original).
Id.
Id. at 2665.
Id. (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823).
Id. (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24).
Id. at 2665 n.12; accord Nash, supra note 3, at 353 (arguing that the Arizona State Legislature
decision avoided the issue of congressional standing).
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those public funds through authorizing legislation.
The House in
its suit argued that Sylvia Burwell, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Jacob Lew, the Secretary of the Treasury, and their respective departments had spent billions of unappropriated dollars to
113
support the ACA in violation of the Clause. The ACA provides sev114
eral types of subsidies, including two relevant to the lawsuit. First,
to assist certain individuals with the cost of insurance on the statute’s
exchanges, Congress in Section 1401 of the ACA “enacted a ‘premium tax credit’ under the Internal Revenue Code for coverage of statutory beneficiaries with household incomes from 100% to 400% of
115
the federal poverty level.”
Second, Section 1402 of the ACA includes “‘cost-sharing’ provisions [that] require insurance companies
that offer qualified health plans through the ACA to reduce the out116
of-pocket cost of insurance coverage for policyholders who qualify.”
“The federal government then offsets the added costs to insurance
117
companies by reimbursing them with funds from the Treasury.”
The House alleged that the executive branch’s funding of Section
118
The House maintained
1402 violated the Appropriations Clause.
that Section 1401 tax credits were legitimately funded by a perma119
nent appropriation in the Internal Revenue Code.
However, the
House contended that “Section 1402 Cost-Sharing Offsets must be
funded and re-funded by annual, current appropriations,” and that
Congress had not appropriated any funds of any type to make any
120
Section 1402 payments to insurance companies. Despite Congress’s
refusal to fund the Section 1402 offsets through a current appropriation, the House alleged that the Secretaries spent public monies on
121
that program beginning in January 2014.

112

113
114
115

116
117

118
119
120
121

U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57–59, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2015)
(concluding that the House had standing to sue, in the context of a case involving a challenge to the federal government’s alleged spending of unappropriated funds).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 59 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)(III) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082
(2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015)) (describing the refundable tax
credits provided under the Act and the category of individuals that qualify for them).
U.S. House of Represenatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18071).
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(3)(A)) (“An issuer of a qualified health plan making
reductions under this subsection shall notify the Secretary of such reductions and the
Secretary shall make periodic and timely payments to the issuer equal to the value of the
reductions.”).
U.S. House of Represenatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 60.
Id.
Id. at 60–62.
Id. at 63.

Oct. 2016]

DOES A HOUSE OF CONGRESS HAVE STANDING?

161

The House relied upon the Coleman decision in arguing that it
had standing as an institution to determine whether the Secretaries
had disrupted the legislative process by spending money without a
122
current appropriation.
The House invoked Coleman to distinguish
between legislative standing in a case ascertaining whether the executive had interfered with the legislative process in contrast to more
questionable suits challenging the executive’s implementation or in123
terpretation of a law.
By contrast, the Secretaries relied primarily
upon Raines in arguing against legislative standing in the case by contending that the House has alleged only an “‘abstract dilution of insti124
tutional legislative power.’”
The district court followed the AT&T decision and the three district court decisions that had found congressional standing in cases in
which Congress, a house of Congress, or a committee sought infor125
mation through a subpoena or pursuant to a statute. Furthermore,
the district court interpreted the Arizona State Legislature decision as
limiting the scope of the Raines decision to suits involving individual
legislators and not to suits by a legislature as an institution, although
the court acknowledged that the Arizona State Legislature case had explicitly avoided the question of congressional standing in suits against
126
the President. The district court conceded that it was addressing an
issue of first impression because “no case has decided whether this
127
institutional plaintiff has standing on facts such as these.”
The district court concluded that the House had standing to challenge the Secretaries’ alleged violation of the Appropriations Clause
by spending “billions of dollars without a valid appropriation, in di128
rect contravention of” the clause. The court rejected the executive
branch’s argument that Congress does not have standing to challenge how the executive implements, interprets or executes a statute
because the House’s Appropriation Clause claim had nothing to do
with the three types of executive action supposedly exempt from leg129
islative suits. The district court explained that:
[T[he Non–Appropriation Theory is not about the implementation, interpretation, or execution of any federal statute. It is a complaint that

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 66–67.
Id.
Id. at 67 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997)).
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68–69 (citing Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2664–65 n.12 (2015)).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 69.
Id. at 69–75.
Id. at 70–73, 75.
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the Executive has drawn funds from the Treasury without a congressional
appropriation—not in violation of any statute, but in violation of Article
I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution. The Non–Appropriation Theory, in other
words, is not about how Section 1402 is being applied, but rather how it
130
is funded.

The district court’s view that the House may challenge the funding of
a statute under the Appropriations Clause negated the executive
branch’s arguments that Congress does not have standing to chal131
lenge how a statute is implemented by executive officials.
The district court determined that the House had a particularized
injury in fact for standing because “Congress (of which the House
and Senate are equal) is the only body empowered by the Constitution to adopt laws directing monies to be spent from the U.S. Treas132
ury.” The court reasoned that the Appropriation Clause’s vesting of
control of federal expenditures in Congress could be nullified if the
133
executive could spend money without authorization.
The only
means to protect the congressional power of the purse was to author134
ize Congress or a house of Congress to sue to enforce the clause.
The district court rejected the Secretaries’ argument that “vindication of the rule of law” is too generalized a grievance to be adjudicat135
ed by an Article III court.
The executive branch had relied on
Raines for the principle that legislators cannot sue over an abstract di136
lution of congressional institutional authority. However, the district
court rejected the executive branch’s analogy to Raines because that
decision involved a suit by only six individual legislators who could
not assert institutional interests rather than an entire house of Con137
gress as in its case. The court reasoned that the House’s suit over
appropriations was more comparable to the Arizona legislature’s institutional suit in Arizona State Legislature where the Court had recog138
nized legislative standing.
Furthermore, the House has an institutional interest in protecting its role in the appropriations process as
defined in the Constitution that is distinct from any injury to the pub130
131

132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 70 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 70–73. But see Zachary Cheslock, Taking on the President: An Uphill Battle for House
Republicans, 47 TOL. L. REV. 159, 169–70 (2015) (arguing that Congress does not have
standing to challenge President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act because Congress could amend or repeal the statute).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 71.
Id. at 71, 73.
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 71–72, 74–75.
Id. at 71–72.
Id.
Id. at 71–72.
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139

lic at large. Moreover, the court reasoned that the alleged constitutional violation could not be resolved by ordinary political methods
without a lawsuit because the House asserted that the executive was
able to circumvent Congress’s alleged denial of funding for Section
140
1402 offsets by obtaining money from other sources.
The court determined that the House “as an institution would suffer a concrete, particularized injury if the Executive were able to draw
funds from the Treasury without a valid appropriation. The House
therefore has standing to sue on its Non-Appropriation Theory, to
141
the extent that it seeks to remedy constitutional violations.”
The
court interpreted the Appropriations Clause to require Congress to
appropriate all federal funds, and, therefore, to establish an injury to
Congress or house of Congress whenever the executive spent such
142
monies without congressional authorization. The court concluded
that “[d]isregard” for constitutional limitations on the executive’s
ability to spend monies without congressional control over spending
“works a grievous harm on the House, which is deprived of its rightful
and necessary place under our Constitution. The House has standing
143
to redress that injury in federal court.” Finally, the court reasoned
that the separation-of-powers concerns raised by the executive did
not preclude the court from deciding the constitutional issues in the
144
case. The court stated: “Despite its potential political ramifications,
this suit remains a plain dispute over a constitutional command, of
145
which the Judiciary has long been the ultimate interpreter.”
However, Judge Collyer concluded that the House did not have
standing to challenge the Treasury’s alleged changes to the start date
of the statute’s employer mandate and the percentage of employees
146
who must be offered insurance by employers. She declined to rec139
140
141

142
143
144

145
146

Id. at 72–75.
Id. at 73–77.
Id. at 74. The district court rejected other counts of the complaint that essentially alleged
that the executive’s implementation of the statute had violated certain provisions in the
statute, because the Constitution does not envision legislative supervision of executive officers and the appropriations process could remedy the alleged statutory issues without a
lawsuit, presuming that the appropriation process itself was not being violated in contradiction of the Constitution. Id. at 74–76.
Id. at 73–77.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 79–80. But see Stern, supra note 25, at 3–4, 42–56 (arguing that separation-of-powers
and political-question doctrine concerns make it unlikely that the Supreme Court will
recognize congressional standing, but acknowledging that the law is not absolutely clear
on this issue).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, 74–76.
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ognize congressional standing in cases where a President has allegedly misinterpreted, misapplied, or declined to enforce a statute because to allow congressional suits over possible statutory violations
would result in far more potential suits than legislative standing limited to alleged constitutional violations, and because private litigants
would be able to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act to chal147
lenge the Treasury’s regulations under the ACA. Both scholars and
members of the Court have debated whether Congress may ever have
standing to challenge a President’s non-enforcement or misinterpretation of a statute, and most have recognized that courts must be extremely cautious in allowing legislative suits because federal courts
should not routinely referee political disputes between the legislative
148
and executive branches.
Part V will examine Justice Scalia’s and
Justice Samuel Alito’s differing views on the appropriateness of congressional standing when a President declines to enforce a federal
149
statute.
Critics of the Burwell decision’s recognition of congressional
standing argue that the case is essentially about the interpretation of
whether Section 1402 constitutes a permanent appropriation or re150
quires annual appropriations. They agree with the Obama Administration that Congress does not have standing to challenge how a
151
statute is implemented by executive officials.
However, Professor

147
148

149
150

151

Id. at 75–76.
Compare Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–76, 625–30 (arguing that Article II grants
the executive branch the exclusive authority to defend federal statutes in court, thus precluding congressional standing and barring Congress from intervening, even when the
president refuses to enforce a law), with Pickett, supra note 31, at 468–75 (arguing that
Congress should have institutional standing when a president refuses to enforce a federal
statute). See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 11–16 (discussing competing scholarly views
on the issue of congressional standing).
See infra Part V.
Nicholas Bagley, Oh Boy. Here We Go Again, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2015,
9:34 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/oh-boy-here-we-go-again (criticizing Judge Collyer’s view that the President’s alleged violation of the Appropriations
Clause provides sufficient grounds for a federal lawsuit, and arguing that that this conception, if accepted, “would mark an unprecedented expansion of judicial authority into
interbranch food fights”); Walter Dellinger, Opinion, House Republicans’ Misguided
Obamacare
Lawsuit,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-houses-misguided-obamacarelawsuit/2015/08/16 (arguing that permitting the House to file suit in federal court because it does not agree with the President’s interpretation of the congressionally enacted
statute at issue would lead to an unprecedented expansion of the authority of federal
judges).
Bagley, supra note 150 (arguing that Judge Collyer’s ruling constitutes “a radicial position
[that] is untenable” and should be overturned on appeal); Cheslock, supra note 131, at
169–70 (arguing that the fact that Congress has alternative remedies to litigation at its
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Jonathan Adler argues that Judge Collyer’s theory of standing in the
case is defensible, although he is not fully convinced by the “novel
152
He points out that
and largely unprecedented standing claim.”
when a federal district court considers a motion to dismiss it must assume the facts argued by the plaintiff, and that the House alleges that
the Obama Administration has spent billions of dollars without its
153
approval.
If the House’s allegations are true, Adler contends the
executive branch’s actions are “egregious,” are more than a “simple
dispute over statutory interpretation,” and arguably entitle the House
to have standing to prevent executive abuse of its legislative authority
154
over appropriations. In 2016, Judge Collyer held on the merits that
the Secretaries violated the Appropriations Clause, Article I, Section 9, clause 7, in using unappropriated monies to fund reimbursements due to insurers under Section 1402, but the court stayed its in155
junction pending appeal by either or both parties.
IV. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE V. CHADHA
The Supreme Court’s decision in Immigration & Naturalization Ser156
vice v. Chadha is an important constitutional precedent because of
its merits holding that separation-of-powers principles in the Constitution prohibit Congress from delegating a power to the executive
branch, but then authorizing one or both houses of Congress to exercise a legislative veto to override that executive decision without going through the mandated bicameral presentment process and veto

152

153

154
155
156

disposal through which it can oppose the ACA establishes that its challenge represents a
purely political question and that it has not legitimately suffered an injury); Dellinger, supra note 150, at 1 (asserting that granting the House standing to sue the executive branch
over interpretations of statutes would be an inapproporiate and radical expansion of authority).
Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, House Obamacare Suit Clears First Major Hurdle (in Part),
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/09/10/house-obamacare-suit-clears-first-major-hurdle-inpart/?utm_term=.f3227a3ccee2 (explaining the House’s argument for standing, while
finding part of its argument unconvincing).
Id. (noting that, on its review of the motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing in
the case at bar, it was required to assume as fact the House’s allegation “that the Administration has, in fact, spent money without legislative appropriation”).
Id.
U.S. House of Representatitves v. Burwell, No. CV 14-1967 (RMC), 2016 WL 2750934, at
*19 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016).
462 U.S. 919 (1983); Mank, supra note 3, at 40–41 (synthesizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha); Hall, supra note 30 (explaining the parameters of Congress’s ability to
assert standing).
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procedure in the Constitution for enacting legislation.
However,
before it could decide the merits, the Court initially had to determine
the question of standing for Mr. Chadha, the executive branch, and
158
Congress. The Chadha decision at least implied that Congress had
standing under the circumstances of a case in which both houses of
159
Congress had intervened as parties. The Court initially noted that
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had granted the separate motions
of the House and the Senate to intervene in the case, and that
160
“[b]oth Houses are therefore proper ‘parties.’” The Court next observed that the case was a “justiciable case or controversy under Art.
III. . . . because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as ad161
verse parties.”
The Chadha decision was different from the legislative standing
cases in Part II because a central issue here was whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) had standing to appeal to the
Supreme Court when it had won a decision in the court of appeals
that the statute was unconstitutional; that issue received more atten162
tion from the Court than whether Congress had standing.
“Both
Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought
from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore
163
cannot appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
The
Chadha decision, however, held “that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking
action it would otherwise take” to be a party for appellate jurisdiction
because the executive branch would have enforced a decision of the
House to deport Mr. Chadha even though the executive argued that
164
the legislative veto requiring it to deport him was unconstitutional.
157

158
159

160
161
162
163
164

See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–59 (noting that Congress had authorized Immigration and
Naturalization Service judges to waive the deportation of certain aliens whose visas had
expired in cases of hardship, but nevertheless concluding that the statute had violated the
separation-of-powers doctrine by granting Congress the authority to override such waivers
without affording the President his constitutional authority to veto any legislative override).
See id. at 929–44 (determining that Mr. Chadha had standing to challenge the legislative
veto provision at issue, despite Congress’s several objections).
Id. at 931 n.6 (finding that the presence of the two houses of Congress appearing as adverse parties in the case satisfied the Article III requirement that an appeal present a justiciable case or controversy).
Id. at 930 n.5 .
Id. at 931 n.6 .
Id. at 929–44 (confirming that the INS had standing to appeal the case to the Supreme
Court).
Id. at 930.
Id. at 930 (describing the process that the INS and Mr. Chadha followed in challenging
the constitutionality of the legislative veto).
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The Chadha decision implied that both the executive branch and
Congress had standing in the case when it stated that “[t]he contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and
165
[the Court is] satisfied the parties are properly before [it].”
The
Chadha decision also stated that any prudential concerns in the case
regarding whether there was an adversary arguing in favor of the
statute’s constitutionality were satisfied when the Court of Appeals
had “invit[ed] and accept[ed] briefs from both Houses of Con166
Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that the intervengress.”
tion of Congress was appropriate under the circumstances of a case in
which the executive refused to defend the constitutionality of a stat167
ute.
“We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that
168
the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”
However, by the time that the Windsor case was decided in 2013,
thirty years after Chadha, the Court did not explicitly recognize standing for Congress, but did allow amicus briefs filed by one house of
Congress to tip the scales in favor of justiciability in a case where the
169
executive refused to defend the constitutionality of a statute.
V. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
A. Overview of Windsor
The law is unclear whether Congress or a house of Congress has
Article III standing to intervene in a lawsuit to defend the constitu170
tionality of a federal statute in the rare case that a president refuses
171
to defend such a statute. In its 2013 decision United States v. Wind165
166
167
168
169
170

171

Id. at 943.
Id. at 940.
Id. at 940 (affirming Congress’s prerogative to defend the constitutionality of the legislative veto before the courts).
Id.
See infra Part V.B.
See The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C.
25 (1981) (“The Department appropriately refuses to defend an act of Congress only in
the rare case when the statute either infringes on the constitutional power of the Executive or when prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that the statute is invalid.”); Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1198 (“[O]ne can say in general that refusals by the executive
branch to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare. But they do occur
. . . .”).
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013) (“The Department of Justice
did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG. The District Court denied BLAG’s motion
to enter the suit as of right, on the rationale that the United States already was represent-
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172

sor, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Section 3
173
President Obama’s
of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).
administration refused to defend the constitutionality of DOMA, but
continued to enforce the statute as a means to create a judicial controversy so federal appeals courts might review the constitutionality of
174
the statute. It was uncertain whether an appeal was appropriate in
the case after a district court held the statute was unconstitutional
175
and the executive concurred with the trial court’s decision.
The
Obama Administration argued that the leadership of the House of
Representatives could file amicus briefs in support of DOMA, but also
contended that the executive branch alone had exclusive authority to
defend federal statutes even if Congress or a house of Congress might
intervene in a case to file amicus briefs in cases where congressional
176
leaders disagree with the executive.

172
173

174

175

176

ed by the Department of Justice. The District Court, however, did grant intervention by
BLAG as an interested party.”); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “the DOJ asks that BLAG’s involvement be limited to making substantive arguments in defense of Section 3 of DOMA while the DOJ continues to
file all procedural notices”); Mank, supra note 3, at 6 (asserting that the Obama Administration enforced DOMA, despite the Administration’s view that the statute was unconstitutional); Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1210–11 (“The Department of Justice has taken the
view that only the executive branch may represent the United States in litigation, or . . .
that any intervention by Congress should be limited to presenting arguments in defense
of a statute’s constitutionality.”).
133 S. Ct. 2675.
See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (codifying sex-specific stipulations on
marriage in the United States). Windsor challenged Section 3 of DOMA, which amended
the federal definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” in Title 1, § 7 of the United States
Code so that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2689–96 (assessing the
validity of DOMA under the U.S. Constitution).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–85 (detailing the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend the constitutionality of the act, while continuing to enforce it); see also Mank, supra
note 3, at 6 (asserting that the Obama Administration still enforced DOMA, despite its
view that it was unconstitutional); infra Part V.B.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (analyzing an amicus brief’s suggestion that once the
executive branch had agreed with Windsor’s position, the two were no longer adverse
parties and it was therefore improper for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari); Mank,
supra note 3, at 6 (adding that before the Windsor opinion, it was unclear if an appeal
from the district court opinion was proper); infra Part V.B.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (“The Department of Justice did not oppose limited intervention by BLAG. The District Court denied BLAG’s motion to enter the suit as of right,
on the rationale that the United States already was represented by the Department of Justice. The District Court, however, did grant intervention by BLAG as an interested party.
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2).”); see also Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24 (stating
that “the DOJ asks that BLAG’s involvement be limited to making substantive arguments
in defense of Section 3 of DOMA while the DOJ continues to file all procedural notices”);
Mank, supra note 3, at 6 (summarizing the executive branch’s argument that it alone has
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In Windsor, the Court did not directly address whether Congress
or a house of Congress has standing to defend a federal statute in the
small number of cases where a president declines to enforce or de177
fend a federal statute. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion
concluded that the executive branch had standing to appeal the trial
court’s decision holding that DOMA was unconstitutional because
the executive continued to enforce the statute when it refused to pay
178
a tax refund to the plaintiff. Furthermore, Windsor recognized the
appropriateness of the amicus brief filed by House of Representatives
leadership supporting the constitutionality of DOMA because that
brief provided a required adverse party for an appeal in a case where
the executive agreed with the trial court that DOMA was unconstitu179
tional.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that Congress almost never has standing to defend or enforce a federal statute because Article II’s Take Care Clause gives an almost exclusive role to
the executive branch to defend federal laws, and contended that no
party had standing to appeal in Windsor because President Obama’s
administration agreed with the district court’s decision holding Sec180
tion 3 to be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s dissent-

177

178

179

180

the authority to defend federal statutes in the courts); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 1210–11
(“The Department of Justice has taken the view that only the executive branch may represent the United States in litigation, or . . . . that any intervention by Congress should be
limited to presenting arguments in defense of a statute’s constitutionality.”).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–88 (reasoning that the House of Representatives had standing despite the executive branch’s refusal to defend the constitutionality of the federal
statute at issue); Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 622 (observing that Windsor did not
reach the issue of whether the House had standing); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that one argument in support of the notion that a President has a duty to enforce all
potentially unconstitutional statutes is because the law is not entirely clear as to whether
Congress has standing and the authority to intervene in order to defend a statute); infra
Part V.C.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (asserting that the executive branch’s refusal to grant the
sought-after relief provides for a degree of adverseness that is sufficient for purposes of
establish a justiciable dispute under Article III); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 6–8, 42
(agreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Windsor that the executive branch
had standing to appeal the lower court’s decision); see infra Part V.C.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687–89 (finding that the congressional committee’s briefs in Windsor provided an adversarial presentation); see also Mank, supra note 3, at 7–8 (speculating
that Windsor will pave the way for Congress, or one of its houses, to defend the constitutionality of a statute in the courts when the executive branch refuses to do so); see infra
Part V.C.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2698–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the courts can only
adjudicate cases where the parties are adversaries seeking opposite outcomes through litigation, and since that requirement was not applicable to the parties in Windsor, the case
should have been dismissed); see infra Part V.D; see also Mank, supra note 3, at 7 n.18 (noting that “Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in full”); id. (explaining that “Chief Justice Roberts joined only the standing portion, Part I, of Scalia’s dissent-
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ing opinion acknowledged the standing of Congress to represent itself in separation-of-powers cases involving its core institutional pow181
ers. On the other hand, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion sought to
recognize the standing of a house of Congress to defend a federal
182
statute that the president refuses to defend.
B. The Preliminary Stages of the Windsor Litigation
Scholars disagree whether the president has a duty under Article
II’s Take Care Clause to enforce a statute the president believes is
183
unconstitutional. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has acknowledged that the executive branch should routinely defend federal
statutes and should refuse to do so only in “rare” cases involving laws
that undermine executive authority or raise serious constitutional

181

182

183

ing opinion, but not his discussion of the merits, as the Chief Justice filed a separate dissenting opinion on the merits”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696–97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting his agreement with Justice Scalia on the point that the Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to review the case).
See id. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[In Chadha] two parties to the litigation disagreed
with the position of the United States and with the court below: the House and Senate,
which had intervened in the case. Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of
congressional action . . . the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what
they claimed to be one of their institutional powers.”); Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at
623 (observing that none of the Justices in Windsor questioned the House or Senate’s authority “to sometimes stand in for the executive and defend federal statutes”); Mank, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that in his dissent in Windsor, Justice Scalia did not dispute Congress’s right to represent itself in separation-of-powers disputes involving its authority).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress has standing to defend the constitutionality of statutes in the courts when the executive branch
fails to do so); infra Part V.E; Mank, supra note 3, at 7 (contending that members of either
house of Congress have standing to defend any statute that the executive branch fails to
defend). But see Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 574, 625–32 (arguing that the Take
Care Clause gives the executive branch exclusive authority to defend federal laws and
therefore bars congressional standing to intervene even when the President refuses to enforce a law, and also contending that bicameral principles in the Constitution bar one
house of Congress from defending a challenged federal statute). Justice Thomas joined
only Parts II and III of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, on the merits, but not Part I on
standing. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681 (listing opinions).
Compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 72 (5th rev.
ed. 1984) (arguing that the president has a duty to enforce statutes he believes unconstitutional), and Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382–84
(1986) (same, but acknowledging that “the Executive can refuse to defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted”), with Neal Devins
& Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509–10,
512–13 (2012) (arguing that the President should not defend or enforce a statute he believes is unconstitutional). See generally Mank, supra note 3, at 4-5, 17-22 (discussing contrasting views on whether a President must defend all federal statutes).
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184

problems. Because it is unclear who has the authority to defend a
federal statute if the executive refuses to do so, an attorney general
might adopt a “middle position” of partially defending or enforcing a
statute while raising or acknowledging doubts about the law’s constitutionality, as the Obama Administration tried to do in the DOMA
185
In 2011, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder incase in Windsor.
formed U.S. House Speaker John Boehner that the DOJ would not
defend the constitutionality of DOMA’s limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples, but implied that the DOJ would still enforce the
law as a means to ensure that federal courts would have jurisdiction
186
to decide the issue of the law’s constitutionality. Because it was likely that the leadership of the House of Representatives would disagree
with his view that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, Attorney
’
General Holder s letter concluded that “[o]ur attorneys will also notify the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases,” but also stated that the executive, through the DOJ, would “remain a part[y] to

184

185

186

The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25
(1981); see also Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1198 (“Thus, one can say in general that refusals
by the executive branch to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare.
But they do occur . . . .”).
See Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care that the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 291, 306–07 (2012) (“Nondefense decisions better respect separation-ofpowers principles than do nonenforcement decisions. . . . Nondefense thus splits the difference: the President defers to Congress by giving the statute effect through enforcement and by giving Congress an opportunity to defend the law, but he also gives voice,
particularly in court, to his own concerns about the act’s constitutionality.”); Walter
Dellinger,
The
DOMA
Decision,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Mar.
1,
2011),
https://newrepublic.com/article/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma (defending
the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not to defend DOMA because
“[h]ere, the president has decided to comply with the law and leave the final decision of
its constitutionality to the courts, a course of action that respects the institutional roles of
both Congress, which passed the law, and the judicial branch”); Mank, supra note 3, at 4–
5, 31–34, 36–38 (explaining the so-called “middle position,” which provides that the executive branch might, in certain situations, choose to enforce a law whose constitutionality it doubted in order to create a justiciable controversy for the court’s review).
See generally Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John
A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involvingdefense-marriage-act [hereinafter Holder Letter] (suggesting that the executive branch
deemed Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional and why it would no longer defend its constitutionality in the courts, even though it would still continue to enforce the law); Mank,
supra note 3, at 31–34, 36–38 (explaining that the executive branch continued to enforce
Section 3 in order to preserve the injuries to pertinent parties, and in turn, preserve their
standing in the courts).

172

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:1

the case and continue to represent the interests of the United States
187
throughout the litigation.”
In Windsor, Edith Windsor did not qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax, which excludes from taxation “any
interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to
his surviving spouse,” because DOMA denied federal recognition of
188
and benefits to same-sex spouses. She paid $363,053 in estate taxes
to the U.S. government, but filed a refund request with the Internal
189
Revenue Service (“IRS”) to seek full reimbursement of those taxes.
The IRS denied her refund request because Windsor was not a “surviving spouse” under DOMA’s heterosexual definition of marriage
190
because she was married to a woman, Thea Spyer. She next filed a
refund suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis191
trict of New York. Windsor argued that DOMA’s denial of federal
tax benefits to same sex married couples violated her constitutional
192
right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.
In Windsor, Attorney General Holder notified the district court
and House Speaker Boehner that the DOJ would not defend the constitutionality of DOMA Section 3, but would continue to enforce the
statute’s denial of federal benefits to same sex married couples while
193
the federal courts decided its constitutionality. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the House of Representatives, which
includes the five majority and minority leaders of the House, voted
along party lines, three Republicans to two Democrats, to intervene
in the Windsor litigation to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of
194
DOMA.
The Department of Justice did not oppose limited inter187

188

189
190
191
192
193

194

Holder Letter, supra note 186 (demonstrating that the Obama Administration knew that
Congress would join the litigation to defend the constitutionality of Section 3); Mank, supra note 3, at 32–33 (noting that Attorney General Holder’s letter served as notice for
Congress to intervene in the pending lawsuits, including Windsor, if it felt so inclined).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a)
(2012)—the federal statute that controls the passing of property to spouses—which did
not apply to the plaintiff in Windsor); Mank, supra note 3, at 36 (adding that the statute
did not apply to the plaintiff in Windsor, because DOMA inhibits federal benefits and
recognition to same-sex couples).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2683–84 (noting the Obama Administration’s policy, encapsulated in Attorney
General Holder’s letter to the House of Representatives, of not defending, but nonetheless enforcing, Section 3); Mank, supra note 3, at 36 (referencing the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (noting that BLAG decided to intervene in the lawsuit); Mank,
supra note 3, at 36 (noting the same). See Brief on the Merits of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, U.S. v. Windsor, U.S. Supreme Court, No.
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vention by BLAG; however, the DOJ continued to represent the U.S.
195
Government in the case. The district court denied BLAG’s motion
to enter the suit as of right because the United States already was represented by the Department of Justice, but did grant BLAG’s inter196
vention as an interested party.
On the merits, the district court ruled against the United States
because it held that Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional and ordered the Treasury to refund the estate tax paid by Windsor with in197
terest. Both the DOJ and BLAG filed notices of appeal even though
the DOJ agreed with the district court’s decision holding Section 3 to
198
be unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Section 3 was uncon199
stitutional. However, the United States refused to comply with the
lower court’s judgment, did not pay a refund to Windsor, and continued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA even though the executive
branch agreed that the statute was unconstitutional in denying feder200
al benefits to same-sex married couples.
The Obama Administration likely continued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA despite its view
that the provision is unconstitutional to maintain sufficient adverse-

195

196

197

198
199
200

12–307, at ii n.* (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourtpreview.org (explaining the status of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in the “Parties to the Proceeding” section of the brief); see also Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1212 (asserting that party politics influenced BLAG voting to interfere in the case); Mank, supra note 3, at 36–37 n.169
(clarifying that during the Windsor litigation, the three Republican leaders in the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group—John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House; Eric Cantor, Majority Leader; and Kevin McCarthy, Majority Whip—supported the House’s intervention to
defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, but the two Democratic leaders—
Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, and Steny H. Hoyer, Democratic Whip—refused to support the majority position).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (explaining that the district court barred BLAG from intervening as of right, but still granting it intervention as an interested party); Mank, supra note
3, at 37 (noting the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)) (explaining that the district
court allowed BLAG to enter the case as an interested party, rather than allowing it intervene as of right in light of what it reasoned was the DOJ’s already active role in representing the United States); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (summarizing the district court’s ruling in favor of Windsor:
Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional and the Department of Treasury was ordered to
refund the plaintiff); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (explaining the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (stating that on appeal, the Second Circuit confirmed the district court’s judgment); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (stating that on appeal, the Second Circuit confirmed the district court’s judgment); Mank, supra note 3, at 37 (stating the same).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (noting that the executive branch had failed to comply with
the district court’s ruling); Mank, supra note 3, at 31, 33, 38 (asserting that the executive
branch failed to comply with the district court’s ruling despite agreeing with the holdings
in order to maintain adverseness on appeal).
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ness between the parties so that there would be Article III standing to
give the Supreme Court the opportunity to decide the constitutional
question in Windsor; there probably would have been no standing for
201
appellate review if the U.S. had paid the tax refund to Windsor.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari so it could review the con202
stitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA. The Court also raised two additional questions: (1) whether the United States’ agreement with
Windsor’s legal position that Section 3 was unconstitutional precluded further appellate review and (2) whether BLAG had standing to
203
appeal the decision.
Because all of the parties agreed that the
Court had jurisdiction to decide Windsor, the Court appointed Professor Vicki Jackson as amicus curiae to argue the contrary view that the
204
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case.
C. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion: The House Leadership’s Intervention
Favors Appellate Standing
In determining whether any party had standing to appeal the
Windsor case to the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion asked the question of “whether either the Government or BLAG,
or both of them, were entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeals and
205
He reasoned
later to seek certiorari and appear as parties here.”
that it was uncontested that Windsor had standing to sue in district
court to seek to recover the estate taxes that Thea Spyer’s estate had
paid to the U.S. government since being forced to disburse an allegedly unconstitutional tax “‘causes a real and immediate economic in206
The Court observed that the exjury to the individual taxpayer.’”
ecutive’s agreement with Windsor that DOMA Section 3 is
unconstitutional did not “deprive[] the [d]istrict [c]ourt of jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the refund suit; for her injury (failure to
obtain a refund allegedly required by law) was concrete, persisting,
207
and unredressed.”

201

202
203
204
205
206
207

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (“It would be a different case if the Executive had taken the
further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she was entitled under the District
Court’s ruling.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 38.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684; Mank, supra note 3, at 38.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (quoting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2553, 2563 (2007)); Mank, supra note 3, at 38–39.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39.
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However, the Windsor decision acknowledged that there was disagreement about “the standing of the parties, or aspiring parties, to
take an appeal in the Court of Appeals and to appear as parties in
208
further proceedings in this Court.” Professor Jackson, acting as the
Court’s designated amicus against jurisdiction, provided a reasonable
argument that no party had appellate standing once the executive
branch and Ms. Windsor agreed with the district court’s decision and,
accordingly, that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
209
lacked jurisdiction over the case. Justice Kennedy summarized her
position as follows:
The amicus submits that once the President agreed with Windsor’s legal
position and the District Court issued its judgment, the parties were no
longer adverse. From this standpoint the United States was a prevailing
party below, just as Windsor was. Accordingly, the amicus reasons, it is inappropriate for this Court to grant certiorari and proceed to rule on the
merits; for the United States seeks no redress from the judgment entered
210
against it.

Disagreeing with Professor Jackson’s arguments, Justice Kennedy
concluded that her view that there was no appellate standing because
the President and Ms. Windsor both agreed with the district court’s
decision “elides the distinction between two principles: the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on its ex211
ercise.” The Windsor decision reasoned, “[i]n this case the United
States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on
appeal and in proceedings before this Court” because the United
States’ refusal to pay the tax refund ordered by the district court created an injury “sufficient” for Article III standing, even if the execu212
tive agreed with Windsor that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional.
The Court conceded, “It would be a different case if the Executive
had taken the further step of paying Windsor the refund to which she
213
was entitled under the District Court’s ruling.”
Accordingly, by
continuing to enforce DOMA Section 3, the DOJ established the
economic injury essential for Article III standing before the Court
214
even while arguing that the provision was unconstitutional.

208
209
210
211
212
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214

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685; Mank, supra note 3, at 39.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 40.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 40.
Mank, supra note 3, at 40.
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215

Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion conceded that the strongest
case supporting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is the Court’s
216
1983 decision in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha. The
Windsor decision appropriately cited Chadha for the proposition that
“even where ‘the Government largely agree[s] with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy,’ there is sufficient adverseness
and an ‘adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Govern217
ment intended to enforce the challenged law against that party.’”
Windsor reasoned that the Obama Administration’s refusal to refund
Windsor’s taxes created sufficient adverseness in light of Chadha’s
218
similar approach.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion questioned whether Chadha actually held that the government had standing before the Supreme
Court or only concluded that the government agency had standing
219
before the court of appeals.
He concluded that the government
did not have standing before the Supreme Court because it agreed
with Ninth Circuit’s decision holding the statute unconstitutional;
however, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress had standing before the Supreme Court in Chadha because its views were adverse to
220
the court of appeals’ decision.
Conversely, the Windsor decision
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Chadha had properly concluded
that the executive branch had standing before both the court of appeals and Supreme Court because the U.S. Government would have
obeyed either court’s decision to deport Chadha, even though the
221
executive argued that a deportation order was unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Windsor decision determined that the executive branch
was sufficiently adverse to Ms. Windsor to have standing because it re222
fused to pay her the tax refund ordered by the district court.
Despite conceding that a prevailing party “generally” is not aggrieved and may not appeal, the Windsor decision reasoned that the
requirement of adverse parties was a flexible prudential principle and

215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The closest we have
ever come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. Chadha.”).
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Mank, supra note 3,
at 40; supra Part IV.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (2013) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 n.12); Mank, supra
note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686-87; Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (majority opinion); Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
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223

not a mandatory Article III rule in all cases.
The Court acknowledged that the government’s method of enforcing a law that it argued was unconstitutional raised prudential concerns about the need
for a genuine adversary to vigorously argue that the statute is consti224
tutional.
The Windsor decision, nevertheless, determined the participation of congressional leaders or a house of Congress as amici
curiae meet the requirement for a valid adversary to argue in favor of
a statute’s constitutionality despite the executive branch’s failure to
225
defend the law. Similarly, in Chadha, the Supreme Court had concluded that any prudential concern for an adversary arguing in favor
of the statute’s constitutionality was satisfied when the court of appeals had “‘invit[ed] and accept[ed] briefs from both Houses of
226
Congress.’”
The Windsor decision concluded that “BLAG’s sharp
adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies the prudential concerns
that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a deci227
sion with which the principal parties agree.” By acknowledging the
role of the BLAG brief in meeting standing principles relating to adversarial parties and stating that congressional briefs played an analogous role in Chadha, the Windsor decision left open the possibility
that in future cases federal courts might grant standing to Congress
or a house of Congress that defend a statute that the executive refuses to defend, although the Court avoided the contentious issue of
whether Congress or a house of Congress would have had standing to
appeal if the executive branch had refused to enforce DOMA entire228
ly.
The Windsor decision did not formally decide whether Congress or
a house of Congress would have had standing to sue on its own because the Court determined that the government had both prudential and Article III standing for appellate review in light of its adverse
229
position of refusing to pay a refund to Windsor. The Court stated,
“[f]or these reasons, the prudential and Article III requirements are
met here; and, as a consequence, the Court need not decide whether
BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court’s ruling
and its affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authori-

223
224
225
226
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333
(1980)) (citing Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011)); Mank, supra note 3, at 42.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687; Mank, supra note 3, at 42–43.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687; Mank, supra note 3, at 43.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940); Mank, supra note 3, at 43.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 43.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687–88; Mank, supra note 3, at 43.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 44.
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230

ty.”
The Windsor decision conceded that the executive’s refusal to
defend DOMA raised serious concerns about whether there would be
adverse parties required for appellate review and that the government’s refusal to defend federal statutes would cause significant is231
sues if non-defense of statutes became a routine practice. However,
the Windsor decision reasoned:
But this case is not routine. And the capable defense of the law by BLAG
ensures that these prudential issues do not cloud the merits question,
which is one of immediate importance to the Federal Government and to
hundreds of thousands of persons. These circumstances support the
232
Court’s decision to proceed to the merits.

D. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in Windsor: Congress Only Has
Standing to Defend Its Core Constitutional Powers
In his dissenting opinion in Windsor, Justice Scalia argued that
Congress only has Article III standing to sue in federal courts when it
is defending its core constitutional powers, as in the Chadha deci233
sion. Furthermore, he contended Congress does not have standing
to defend federal statutes, even when the executive refuses to defend
234
a statute, as in Windsor.
Accordingly, Justice Scalia would allow
Congress or a house of Congress to have standing in only limited circumstances because he believed that Article II usually gives the President exclusive authority under the Take Care Clause to defend or enforce federal laws, unless a law infringes upon essential congressional
235
authority.
Although conceding that Ms. Windsor had standing to sue in federal district court for a tax refund, Justice Scalia in his dissenting
opinion argued that no party in the Windsor case had standing to appeal the district court’s judgment because both Ms. Windsor and the
U.S. government agreed with the court’s determination that DOMA
236
Section 3 is unconstitutional.
Because Article III standing mandates that a party demonstrate that it has an injury requiring redress,
he argued that friendly, non-adversarial parties may not collude to
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688; Mank, supra note 3, at 44.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688–89; Mank, supra note 3, at 44.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689; Mank, supra note 3, at 44–45.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–
46.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–51.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–01, 2703–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–
47.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699–2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45.
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237

obtain an advisory opinion from a federal court.
He argued that
the Court had never before recognized a suit where a petitioner ef238
Justice
fectively sought an affirmance of the judgment against it.
Scalia’s dissenting opinion conceded that “[t]he closest we have ever
come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v.
Chadha,” but he argued that the two cases were distinguishable because in Chadha the House and Senate intervened in the case to de239
fend their core constitutional powers.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that the executive usually has exclusive authority under Article II’s Take Care Clause to defend, or not to defend, federal statutes, even in cases when a Presi240
dent refuses to enforce or defend a federal statute.
However, he
admitted an exception, as in the Chadha decision, where Congress is
241
protecting its institutional authority.
Justice Scalia explained that
the Chadha litigation involved the institutional powers of Congress
and, accordingly, Congress had standing to sue in that case, but not
in a case like Windsor where it sought to defend a statute unrelated to
242
its core institutional powers, such as DOMA.
Conversely, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion argued that Justice
Scalia’s and the United States’ argument that the precedent for congressional standing in Chadha should be construed to apply only to
rare cases when Congress is defending its institutional or procedural
authority raises difficult line drawing issues since Congress also has a
strong institutional interest in defending federal statutes because
243
lawmaking is a core legislative function. Because reading Chadha to
permit Congress or a house of Congress standing to defend federal
statutes that involve Congress’s institutional authority could be expanded to encompass standing in other situations, such as the Wind237

238
239
240
241

242
243

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45; see also Hall,
supra note 30, at 1550–51 (“[A]s a textual matter, the Cases or Controversies Clause
seems plainly to require interested parties on both sides of the case. A one-sided ‘case’ or
‘controversy’ is an oxymoron.”).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699–700 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700–2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2700 n.2 (“[In Chadha] the Justice
Department’s refusal to defend the legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and
entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend legislation that in its view infringes
upon Presidential powers.”); Mank, supra note 3, at 46; see also Hall, supra note 30, at 1549
(“Chadha, in short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional stake to support a
case or controversy where it seeks to defend a power granted to it by a statute. Chadha
does not hold that Congress may intervene to defend any challenged federal statute . . . .”).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 46.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713–14 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46.
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sor case where the executive declined to defend the constitutionality
of a statute, some scholars contend that a president’s prerogative to
defend federal statutes pursuant to Article II’s Take Care Clause is
completely exclusive and that the Chadha decision was incorrectly decided to the extent it allowed congressional standing to defend any
244
Justice
statute, even ones related to core congressional powers.
Scalia, however, took a middle position between Justice Alito and academics favoring exclusive executive defense of federal statutes by
distinguishing Chadha as the rare case where Congress has standing
to defend its institutional prerogatives, but arguing that congressional
standing was inappropriate in Windsor where President Obama’s refusal to defend DOMA Section 3 had no impact on core congression245
al authority.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that neither Ms. Windsor
nor the U.S. government had standing to appeal from the district
court’s decision in Windsor because both she and the executive
246
agreed with the trial court’s judgment. Conversely, the majority in
the Windsor decision reasoned that the Supreme Court in Chadha had
stated that the INS had standing before both the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court despite the government’s position agreeing with
Mr. Chadha that the deportation statute at issue was unconstitutional
because the executive branch would have obeyed either court’s decision to deport Chadha, and, accordingly, the U.S. government was
sufficiently adverse to Chadha to meet Article III standing require247
ments before the Supreme Court.
Analogously, the Windsor decision concluded that the U.S. government was sufficiently adverse to
Ms. Windsor’s interests to have Article III standing to appeal to both
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court because the executive

244

245

246
247

Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–75, 623–30 (arguing Take Care Clause gives a President exclusive authority to defend federal laws, excludes congressional standing to intervene even when if a president refuses to enforce law and that Chadha decision was incorrect to recognize congressional standing to defend federal statutes even in limited cases);
Mank, supra note 3, at 46. But see Gorod, supra note 31, at 1219–20 (“Defending [a]
law . . . . does not focus on the operation of the law and generally will not affect its operation at all. . . . [T]he Executive simply provides the court with its understanding of what
the Constitution requires . . . .”); Greene, supra note 33, at 592 (contending that, if Congress sues for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a law, Congress is not
“controlling the execution of law”).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700, 2700 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 46–47;
see also Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 623 (“[N]o Justice in Windsor challenged the
power of the House or the Senate to sometimes stand in for the executive and defend
federal statutes.”).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 47–48.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 48.
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refused to pay her the estate tax refund mandated by the district
248
court’s decision. The disagreement between Justice Scalia and the
majority over whether the executive was sufficiently adverse to Ms.
Windsor’s interests to have Article III standing to appeal to the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court is relevant to the question congressional standing because the argument for legislative standing is
arguably greater when a president refuses to defend a federal statute
or the executive lacks standing to defend a statute, as Justice Alito ar249
gued in his dissenting opinion in Windsor.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion clearly rebuked the majority
opinion’s approach that “the requirement of adverseness” between
the parties in a case is only a “prudential” principle of standing that is
250
waivable by the federal courts in appropriate cases. He argued that
the Court had previously treated adverseness between the parties as
251
He reasoned that the
an essential Article III standing mandate.
availability of amicus curiae willing to skillfully argue the other side of
a question did not meet the Article III requirement that there must
be adverse parties to establish a justiciable “case” or “controversy” in
252
federal court.
Under Justice Scalia’s approach to executive and legislative standing, Congress or a house of Congress would not have standing to sue
whenever a President refuses to defend a statute, but only if Congress
253
sues to protect its core institutional powers, as in Chadha. According to Justice Scalia, Congress must normally use its legislative authorities, including limiting appropriations or refusing to confirm presidential appointees instead of suing the executive in federal court, to
protest a President’s refusal to defend or enforce a law unrelated to
254
core congressional institutional authority. In many cases, however,
it may be impractical for Congress or a house of Congress to act
against such executive recalcitrance, especially if the Senate and the
255
House cannot agree on concerted action.
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686; Mank, supra note 3, at 48.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting); infra Part V.E; Mank, supra note 3, at
7, 52–56.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 49.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 45–46.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 51.
Greene, supra note 33, at 591 (discussing practical problems facing Congress in protesting a president’s refusal to enforce or defend a statute); Mank, supra note 3, at 51–52, 51
n.261 (noting the same).
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E. Justice Alito’s Argument for Congressional Standing by a House Of
Congress Where a President Refuses to Defend a Federal Statute
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the executive was not
an appropriate adverse party before the Supreme Court in Windsor
because the United States concurred with Ms. Windsor that the Dis256
trict Court’s judgment striking down DOMA Section 3 was valid.
Then, Justice Alito addressed the “much more difficult question” of
whether the leadership of the House of Representatives, BLAG, had
257
standing to appeal that decision. Disagreeing with both the majority and Justice Scalia, Justice Alito determined that BLAG had “Article
III standing in its own right, quite apart from its status as an interve258
nor.”
Justice Alito argued that BLAG had Article III standing to appeal
the district court’s decision in Windsor because it was the authorized
representative of the House of Representatives, which was entitled to
standing in that case since it suffered an injury in fact when the executive refused to enforce DOMA Section 3 and that injury was redress259
able by a decision in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.
He
supported his view that BLAG had standing by citing Chadha’s holding that both houses of Congress were “‘proper parties’” to defend
260
the constitutionality of the one-house veto statute in that case. Justice Alito inferred that the Chadha decision’s recognition of congressional standing was based on an unspoken reasoning that Congress
suffers an injury sufficient for standing purposes in every case where a
federal statute passed by Congress is struck down by a lower court as
261
unconstitutional and the executive refuses to appeal that decision.
The United States sought to distinguish Chadha from the situation in
Windsor by treating the former decision as “‘involv[ing] an unusual
statute that vested the House and the Senate themselves each with
special procedural rights—namely, the right effectively to veto Execu262
tive action.’”
Justice Scalia offered similar arguments for distinguishing the two cases when he claimed that congressional standing

256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14, 2712 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting and discussing Chadha);
Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 52.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the United States on
the Jurisdictional Questions at 36, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No.
12-307)); Mank, supra note 3, at 52–53.
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in Chadha applied only to cases in which the executive refuses to defend a statute that implicates a core institutional legislative authori263
ty.
Disagreeing with both the U.S. government and Justice Scalia on
congressional standing, Justice Alito provided a novel approach that
Congress has standing in every case in which the U.S. government
declines to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute because
264
enacting such statutes is Congress’s “central function.”
Rejecting
both the U.S. government’s and Justice Scalia’s interpretation of
Chadha as a case involving the power of the legislative branch, Justice
Alito argued:
But that is a distinction without a difference: just as the Court of Appeals
decision that the Chadha Court affirmed impaired Congress’ power by
striking down the one-house veto, so the Second Circuit’s decision here
impairs Congress’ legislative power by striking down an Act of Congress.
The United States has not explained why the fact that the impairment at
issue in Chadha was “special” or “procedural” has any relevance to whether Congress suffered an injury. Indeed, because legislating is Congress’
central function, any impairment of that function is a more grievous in265
jury than the impairment of a procedural add-on.

Justice Alito relied upon the Coleman decision, which held that a
group of state senators who arguably cast the decisive votes to defeat a
proposed amendment to the federal constitution had standing to
contest the amendment’s validity, to support his theory that Congress
or a house of Congress has standing to defend any statute that the
266
He argued that the House of Repreexecutive refuses to defend.
sentatives was a “necessary party” for DOMA’s passage, and, therefore
267
had standing in Windsor. He explained,
By striking down § 3 of DOMA as unconstitutional, the Second Circuit effectively “held for naught” an Act of Congress. Just as the state-senatorpetitioners in Coleman were necessary parties to the amendment’s ratification, the House of Representatives was a necessary party to DOMA’s passage; indeed, the House’s vote would have been sufficient to prevent

263

264
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Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (“Because Chadha
concerned the validity of a mode of congressional action—the one-house legislative veto—the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what they claimed to be
one of their institutional powers. The Executive choosing not to defend that power, we
permitted the House and Senate to intervene. Nothing like that is present here.”); Mank,
supra note 3, at 53.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–13 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53.
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DOMA’s repeal if the Court had not chosen to execute that repeal judi268
cially.

Disagreeing with both the United States and the Court-appointed
amicus, Professor Jackson, Justice Alito argued that the Raines deci269
sion had not rejected congressional standing in all circumstances.
He contended that “Raines dealt with individual Members of Congress and specifically pointed to the individual Members’ lack of institutional endorsement as a sign of their standing problem” and there270
fore, only barred standing in suits brought by individual legislators.
Justice Alito distinguished Windsor as different from the individual
suits in Raines because BLAG represented the House of Representa271
tives as an institution.
Additionally, he reasoned that BLAG and the House in the Windsor litigation were more similar to the key legislators whose votes controlled the outcome in Coleman than the individual legislators in
Raines, who had not played an important role in enacting the chal272
lenged legislation. He reasoned that,
[T]he Members in Raines—unlike the state senators in Coleman—were
not the pivotal figures whose votes would have caused the Act to fail absent some challenged action. Indeed, it is telling that Raines characterized Coleman as standing “for the proposition that legislators whose votes
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act
have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not
go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.” 521 U.S., at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312. Here, by contrast, passage by the
House was needed for DOMA to become law. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7 (bi273
cameralism and presentment requirements for legislation).

Disagreeing with both the U.S. government and Justice Scalia on
congressional standing, Justice Alito concluded that Congress or a
house of Congress has the institutional authority to defend federal
statutes when a President declines to do so:
I appreciate the argument that the Constitution confers on the President
alone the authority to defend federal law in litigation, but in my view, as I
have explained, that argument is contrary to the Court’s holding in
Chadha, and it is certainly contrary to the Chadha Court’s endorsement of
the principle that “Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a
statute” when the Executive refuses to do so onconstitutional grounds.
462 U.S., at 940, 103 S. Ct. 2764; see also 2 U.S.C. § 288h(7) (Senate Legal Counsel shall defend the constitutionality of Acts of Congress when
268
269
270
271
272
273

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 53–54.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 54.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 54.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712 n.2, 2013; Mank, supra note 3, at 54.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714; Mank, supra note 3, at 54.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714; Mank, supra note 3, at 54.
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placed in issue). Accordingly, in the narrow category of cases in which a
court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended stat274
ute and is a proper party to do so.

F. Criticisms of Congressional Standing and Especially Justice Alito’s Broad
Approach to Congressional Standing
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Alito’s theory of congressional
standing and responded that a President has almost exclusive sole authority under the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution to
defend or enforce every federal statute, except in cases like Chadha
275
where Congress is suing to protect its core institutional authority.
Justice Scalia argued that Justice Alito’s approach to congressional
standing did almost as much damage to the separation of powers as
the majority’s overly lenient approach to standing by “similarly elevat[ing] the Court to the ‘primary’ determiner of constitutional questions involving the separation of powers, and, to boot, increas[ing]
the power of the most dangerous branch” by establishing a new system “in which Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not
only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to correct a
276
perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws.”
Justice Scalia
maintained that Justice Alito’s view of congressional standing would
undermine the traditional standing model based on private lawsuits
by only those actually injured by a law to instead establish a new paradigm “in which Congress and the Executive can pop immediately into court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President refuses to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and
whenever he implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress’s
277
liking.”
Justice Scalia’s interpretation that Justice Alito’s theory of congressional standing would enable Congress to sue in federal court
274
275

276
277

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); Mank, supra note 3,
at 55.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing a president has broad discretion whether to enforce federal laws pursuant to the Take Care Clause in the Constitution and that Congress does not have standing without an injury to challenge executive
non-enforcement); Mank, supra note 3, at 56; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding that Article II and Article III of the Constitution limit
Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury);
Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 572–73, 625–30 (arguing that the Take Care Clause
gives the executive exclusive authority to defend federal laws thus excluding congressional standing to intervene even when a President refuses to enforce a law).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 56.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 56–57.
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whenever a president “implements a law in a manner that is not to
Congress’s liking” is a questionable and likely unfair analysis of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, because the Windsor decision involved
the much narrower question of a President who refused to defend a
federal statute, and Justice Alito never directly stated such a broad
278
approach to standing. Justice Scalia made a more reasonable criticism when he opined that Justice Alito’s theory of congressional
standing could allow plaintiffs to make believable arguments that
federal courts may consider political disputes historically rejected as
279
unsuitable for adjudication. Justice Scalia asserted that the “reasoning” of Raines foreclosed suits by Congress about how a President executes federal statutes even though Justice Alito was correct that that
decision “did not formally decide this issue” because the decision
treated several types of disputes between a president and Congress
regarding such matters as the appointment power, removal power,
280
legislative veto and pocket veto as non-justiciable by federal courts.
Rejecting Justice Alito’s broad view of congressional standing, Justice
Scalia contended that a President and Congress should use traditional political methods such as the denial of appropriations or executive
appointments when Congress seeks to punish a President who refuses
281
to defend a statute that Congress believes is constitutional. However, some theoretical political remedies such as Congress’s impeach282
ment authority, which requires a two-thirds vote by the Senate, are
impractical, and, therefore, a lawsuit may be the only effective way for
283
Congress to challenge some executive decisions.
Some academics have reasoned that the bicameral structure of
Congress mandates that both houses agree to act to challenge presidential decisions, and, therefore, does not allow one house to take

278
279
280
281
282

283

Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with id. at 2711–14 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 3, at 57.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) at 2704–05; Mank, supra note 3, at 57.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
See Greene, supra note 33, at 591 (contending that the impeachment process is impractical in addressing many executive actions); Mank, supra note 3, at 51–52 (same); Nash, supra note 3, at 362–63, 388 (arguing the availability of impeachment would doom legislators’ standing); Pickett, supra note 31, at 473–74 (asserting impeachment would be too
broad a step for executive nonenforcement). But see Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at
624 (“In separating legislation from implementation, moreover, the Constitution makes
clear that Congress may not control those implementing federal law—outside the appointment, statutory, and removal mechanisms specified in the Constitution.”).

Oct. 2016]

DOES A HOUSE OF CONGRESS HAVE STANDING?

187

independent judicial action; their position implicitly contradicts Justice Alito’s view that BLAG had standing in the Windsor decision on
behalf of the House of Representatives to appeal the district court’s
284
decision that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional.
Conversely,
there is a plausible argument that the Constitution’s proscription for
bicameral legislative decisions in Article I, Section 1—compelling all
legislative authority to be consigned to a Congress including a Senate
and a House of Representatives—and Section 7—necessitating all
bills be passed by both the House and Senate before being presented
to the President—do not squarely bar congressional standing by one
285
house of Congress. Furthermore, some constitutional provisions do
not require bicameralism such as the Senate’s appointment of federal
286
officers and judges.
Additionally, Justice Alito in his Windsor dissenting opinion suggested that neither Coleman nor Raines imposed
287
bicameral action requirements on all congressional litigation.
Professor Grove has claimed that Congress lacks Article III standing to defend federal statutes in federal court because Article I of the
Constitution does not affirmatively grant Congress the authority to
288
enforce or defend federal statutes in Article III courts. Conversely,
she implicitly concedes that her argument is inconsistent with
Chadha, and, as a result, she contends that decision was incorrectly
decided to the degree it authorized the House and the Senate to intervene in the case to defend the constitutionality of the challenged
289
Although Justice Scalia believes that Congress does not
statute.

284

285

286
287
288
289

Compare Grove & Devins, supra note 31, at 573–75, 603–22 (arguing that bicameral principles in the Constitution bar one house of Congress from defending challenged federal
statutes), with Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing BLAG had
standing in the Windsor decision on behalf of the House of Representatives to appeal the
district court’s decision that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional); see Mank, supra note 3,
at 54–55.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (prescribing bicameralism and presentment requirements for legislation); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–46 (1983) (discussing bicameral provisions in Article I of the Constitution); Mank, supra note 3, at 55.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Nash, supra note 3, at 366.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713–14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing Coleman and Raines);
Mank, supra note 3, at 55.
Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1315–16, 1353–65
(2014); Mank, supra note 3, at 56.
Grove, supra note 288, at 1360–61; (“The Supreme Court overlooked these structural
concerns [arguing against congressional enforcement or defense of federal laws] entirely
in Chadha, when it permitted the House and Senate counsel to intervene in defense of
the statute authorizing the legislative veto. . . . But the Court did not authorize intervention by any component of Congress until Chadha. Given the lack of historical support for
the Court’s assertion, and the fact that the Court did not even hold that the House or the
Senate had standing to appeal, this one-sentence declaration in Chadha provides scant
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have standing to challenge the almost exclusive executive authority
under Article II to defend or enforce most statutes without legislative
intervention, he acknowledges that the Chadha decision was correct
290
in allowing Congress to defend its core institutional powers.
CONCLUSION
While there are many unanswered questions about when Congress
or a house of Congress has standing to sue a President, Judge Collyer’s decision in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell was on solid
ground in allowing a house of Congress to challenge President
Obama’s alleged misuse of the appropriations process, because that
process is a core institutional power of Congress and of the House of
Representatives in particular, where appropriation bills are supposed
291
to originate.
The Raines decision appropriately limited suits and
standing by individual legislators because of the potential for endless
292
lawsuits that could clog the federal courts. By contrast, the Coleman
decision allowed a suit that addressed whether the Kansas executive
293
Furhad nullified a law so as to defeat the will of the legislature.
thermore, Judge Collyer appropriately relied upon the Supreme
Court’s Arizona State Legislature decision and a series of cases in the
D.C. Circuit for the principle that a state legislature, Congress, or a
house of Congress may defend its institutional authority against executive interference or other potentially unconstitutional institu294
tions.
There are difficult line drawing questions between when Congress
is challenging how a President implements or enforces a law, and
when executive action intrudes on core institutional legislative au295
thority. But the Chadha decision clearly implied that Congress has
standing to sue when the executive branch allegedly intrudes on core

290

291

292
293
294
295

support for congressional standing to represent the federal government in court.”);
Mank, supra note 3, at 56.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the executive in
most circumstances has exclusive authority to defend federal statutes under Article II thus
excluding congressional standing to intervene even when a President refuses to enforce a
law, but acknowledging an exception in Chadha where Congress is defending its core institutional authority under the Constitution); Mank, supra note 3, at 53–56.
See supra Part III; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”).
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B and III.
See supra Parts II.A.4 and Part III.
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296

legislative authority.
Granting standing to Congress or a house of
Congress does not guarantee that the legislature will prevail on the
merits of its suit. In the end, federal courts may conclude that President Obama’s appropriations under Section 1402 do not violate the
297
Appropriations Clause. This Article advocates standing in this suit,
but does not offer an opinion on the ultimate merits of the case.
298
Judge Collyer did not discuss either Chadha or Windsor. Chadha
at least indirectly addressed and supported the issue of congressional
institutional suits, which were not at issue in the Coleman or the Arizo299
na State Legislature decisions because they involved state legislators.
The Windsor majority decision did not directly address congressional
300
However, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Windsor
standing.
acknowledged that Congress has standing to challenge a statute that
301
threatens its core institutional authority as in the Chadha decision.
Even if the Court is not willing to endorse Justice Alito’s broad approach to congressional standing in his dissenting opinion in Wind302
sor, Judge Collyer’s opinion arguably goes no further than Justice
Scalia or Chadha in supporting congressional standing to challenge
executive actions or statutes that threaten Congress’s core institu303
tional authority. Additionally, the Windsor majority decision arguably implicitly supported action by a house of Congress in taking into
account the BLAG amicus brief as a significant factor in recognizing
standing in that case, although the Court deliberately avoided the
304
contentious question of congressional standing.
Accordingly, U.S.
House of Representatives v. Burwell appropriately found congressional
standing to challenge President Obama’s alleged misuse of the appropriations process because a core institutional power of Congress
305
was at stake.
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.D.
See supra Part V.E.
See supra Parts III, IV and V.D.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Parts III. See generally Adler, supra note 152 (arguing law surrounding congressional standing is unclear, but that Judge Collyer’s recognition of standing is plausible in
light of the danger of executive overreach into core legislative authority); Pickett, supra
note 31, at 468–75 (arguing Congress should have institutional standing when a president
refuses to enforce a federal statute because a president has violated the Take Care Clause
in the Constitution and political remedies are ineffective). But see Bagley, supra note 150,
at 1–2 (arguing Judge Collyer’s recognition of standing in U.S. House of Representatives v.
Burwell was wrong because the case involved a question of statutory interpretation
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through the implementation of a statute and that her approach would undermine standing limits by allowing Congress to “dress[] up a statutory claim in constitutional garb”);
Cheslock, supra note 131, at 163–74 (arguing the political question doctrine and lack of
standing bar Burwell suit); Dellinger, supra note 150, at 2–3 (arguing judicial recognition
of standing in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell would lead to a vast and unwarranted
expansion of standing when the executive and legislature disagree about the interpretation of a statute). See generally Stern, supra note 25, at 3–4, 42-56 (arguing that separation
of powers and political question doctrine concerns make it unlikely Supreme Court will
recognize congressional standing, but acknowledging the law is not absolutely clear on issue of congressional standing).

